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Employment Law. Bunch v. Board of Review, Rhode Island Department of Employment and Training, 690 A.2d 335 (R.I. 1997).
When reviewing an administrative-agency finding, the court may
not substitute its judgment where competent evidence existed to
support the agency's finding. The Rhode Island Training School
for Youth (RITS) superintendent's drug-possession charge is competent evidence of job-related misconduct to support the board of
review's denial of unemployment benefits.

FACTS AND TRAVEL

The Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) employed C. Mae Bunch (Bunch) as superintendent of the RITS.' On
February 5, 1994, Bunch summoned the West Warwick police to
her home because she thought she heard an intruder in her basement. 2 The police found Bunch clutching a machete and appearing
to be nervous and emotional. 3 Officers searched the bottom level of
the house, but did not find any signs of an intruder.4 Bunch then
asked the police to search the rest of her house. While conducting
the search, one officer found drug paraphernalia and a white powder in the master bedroom. The officer read Bunch her Miranda
rights and brought her to the police station. Later, the police released Bunch, advising her of possible further criminal action
pending toxicology tests on the white powder.5
That evening, Bunch called Linda D'Amario Rossi, DCYF's director and Bunch's supervisor. 6 Bunch told Rossi that the police
responded to her home, but did not mention the other events. 7 A
member of the West Warwick police later told Rossi about the discovery made at Bunch's home. The next evening, police responded
to another call from Bunch. Officers found her holding a two-inch
by four-inch piece of wood, claiming that an intruder was in her
1. See Bunch v. Board of Review, Rhode Island Dept. of Employment and
Training, 690 A.2d 335, 335 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id.

3. See id. at 335-36.
4. See id. at 336.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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home.8 The police conducted a search and again found no sign of
an intruder.9
Toxicology tests proved that the white substance found in
Bunch's home was cocaine. 10 Police issued an arrest warrant, and
criminal charges were filed against Bunch. 1 ' Bunch was placed on
administrative leave. 12 After an administrative meeting, she was
fired from her job. On February 18, 1994, Bunch applied for unemployment compensation. That claim was denied. Bunch appealed the denial to the board of review. 13 The referee found that
Rossi had discharged Bunch for proven misconduct, including
"willful and wanton disregard of the standards of behavior which
the employer had the right to expect."1 4 Bunch "violated the obligations and duties of her position with substantial disregard of the
employer's interests by making misleading and incorrect statements to [Rossi]." i s
The board of review affirmed the referee's decision, with one
member dissenting.' 6 In Rhode Island District Court, the trial
judge reversed the board's decision, finding "that no evidence of
job-related misconduct existed."17 The judge held that the criminal charges did not relate to Bunch's official duties. Therefore, the
state should not disqualify her from collecting unemployment
compensation.i 8
BACKGROUND
A judge may only reverse the findings of an administrative
agency where the conclusions and findings of fact are "totally devoid of competent evidentiary support in the record."' 9 Section 428. See id. In addition, Bunch claimed that her neighbors were not speaking
to her, the police had "bugged" her phones, and they were out "to get" her. Id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 336-37. Bunch was later found guilty of cocaine possession and
was sentenced to two years probation. Tracy Brenton, Bunch Paid Improperly,
Court Rules, Prov. J. Bull. Mar. 2, 1997, at B1.
19. Id. at 337.
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35-15 of the Rhode Island General Laws governs judicial review of
administrative-agency decisions. This section reads in part:
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand
the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify
the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, in[terlferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error or law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse20of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Under section 28-44-18 of the Rhode Island General Laws, an
employee "who has been discharged for proved misconduct connected with his or her work shall thereby become ineligible for benefits." 2 1 The Rhode Island Supreme Court defined misconduct

under section 28-44-18 in Turner v. Department of Employment Se22
curity, Board of Review.
Turner was a fire inspector who had been selling fire-door approval tags to builders who then attached them to unapproved
doors. 23 He was charged with two misdemeanors, obtaining money
under false pretenses and failing to fulfill the duties of his office
conscientiously. 24 On March 15, 1977, the Rhode Island District
Court found Turner guilty of both counts. 2 5 Turner appealed this
conviction. On May 13, 1977, he pleaded nolo contendere to both
26
counts.
20.
21.
22.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15 (1993).
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-18 (1995).
479 A.2d 740 (R.I. 1984).

23.
24.
25.
26.

See
See
See
See

id. at 740-41.
id. at 741.
id.
id.
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In March of 1997, Turner resigned "under threat of dismissal."2 7 Turner was turned down for unemployment benefits by the
director of the Department of Employment Security for Misconduct
under section 28-44-18. The referee and the board of review up28
held the decision, and the Rhode Island District Court affirmed.
Turner appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. The issue was whether Turner's plea of nolo contendere was sufficient
competent evidence for the board of review to disqualify him from
collecting unemployment benefits. 29 The court found the fire inspector's actions to be job-related misconduct. 30 The court upheld
the district court's definition, which stated in part:
Misconduct... is limited to conduct evincing such willful or
wanton disregard of an employer's interest as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior
which the employer has the right to expect of his [or her] employee, . . or to show an intentional and substantial disregard
of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his employer. 3 1
The court also said that when deciding whether to grant benefits,
the board "should have the broadest range of evidence before it and
not be constrained by the judicial or Administrative Procedures
32
Act evidentiary rules."
Later, in St. Pius X Parish Corp. v.Murray,3 3 the supreme
court said that "there is no requirement that an employee's actions
rise to the level of criminal conduct present in Turner before becoming statutory misconduct."3 4 In Technic, Inc. v. Rhode Island
Department of Employment and Training,35 Technic had discharged the claimant for what his employer called proven misconduct. The president of the company testified that the "claimant
was discharged following a long history of tardiness, drug-related
problems, a habit of sleeping on the job, and evidence that he had
stolen slivers of gold from the workplace." 36 The vice-president tes27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
See id.
See id. at 742.
See id. at 741-42.
Id. (quoting Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 296 N.W. 636 (Wis. 1941)).
Id. at 743.
557 A.2d 1214 (R.I. 1989).
Id. at 1218.
669 A.2d 1156 (R.I. 1996).
Id. at 1157.
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tified that the claimant sold drugs to another employee and that
600 ounces of gold were missing from the claimant's work area
although the company was unable to prove that the claimant stole
37
the gold.
The referee found that Technic fired the claimant because of
the missing 600 ounces of gold. 3 8 Since Technic did not have sufficient evidence to prove that the claimant stole the gold, the claimant was not fired for misconduct under section 28-44-18. 3 9 Both
the board and the Rhode Island District Court affirmed the referee's decision. 40
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed and held the decision of the board to be clearly erroneous. 4 1 The court found Technic had "presented uncontroverted and unrefuted evidence of the
claimant's sale of marijuana and his theft of slivers of gold, independent of the missing 600 ounces of gold, whereas the claimant
42
offered no evidence to refute the petitioner's case against him."
The court stated that the record contained "evidence of proven misconduct sufficient to support claimant's discharge for misconduct."4 3
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In Bunch, relying heavily on the nature of Bunch's position,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court pointed to evidence showing that
the criminal charges against Bunch were job-related conduct. The
court stated that Bunch held a position of "high visibility and great
responsibility."4 4 DCYF entrusted her with the care of juveniles,
many of whom were in the training school because of drug-related
offenses.4 5 Her ability to carry out the duties of her job "not only
46
was impaired, but was totally extinguished by such conduct."
In addition, Bunch "had an obligation to maintain standards
of conduct at the very least in compliance with the criminal law
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 1158.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1160.
Id.
Id. at 1159.
Bunch, 690 A.2d at 337.
See id. at 337-38.
Id. at 338.
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both on and off the job."47 Rossi "had the right to expect from the
claimant a reasonable standard of obedience to the criminal law
both on and off the premises of her employment." 48 Illegal-drug
possession was a violation of this standard of conduct Rossi had a
49
right to expect.
The court concluded that "the District Court judge substituted
his judgment for that of the board of review in drawing the inference from all the relatively undisputed facts that the claimants
conduct was not job-related." 50 Competent evidence existed that
Bunch's conduct was job-related misconduct. 5 1 The court quashed
52
the judgment and remanded the case to the district court.
CONCLUSION

In Turner, the claimant's misconduct occurred within the context of his job and was directly contrary to his position. In Technic,
the claimant's illegal conduct took place while he was working.
The court in Bunch extended misconduct to include conduct which
occurred outside the workplace.
Lisa M. Kolb

47. Id. at 337.
48. Id. at 338.
49. See id. at 337.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 338.

52. See id. Although the supreme court held the denial of unemployment compensation was proper, the state is unable to collect the $8,400.00 Bunch had already received because of existing law. Brenton, supra note 18, at B1.

